State of Utah v. Angela Rasmussen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Angela Rasmussen : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randy T. Austin; Kirton and McConkie; Attorney for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Katherine
Bernards-Goodman; Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Rasmussen, No. 20000773 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2883
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 20000773-CA 
ANGELA RASMUSSEN, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 
(1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. 
DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RANDY T. AUSTIN 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
KATHERINE BERNARDS-
GOODMAN 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUBSn 
Utah*? 
Paute 
Gierke 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 20000773-CA 
v. 
ANGELA RASMUSSEN, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 
(1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. 
DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RANDY T. AUSTIN 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
KATHERINE BERNARDS-
GOODMAN 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS SUBSTANTIALLY FAILED 
TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE 
JURY'S VERDICT, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO 
CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S NONMERITORIOUS 
CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE . . . 20 
i 
A. Defendant failed to marshal the evidence 12 
B. The evidence of defendant's guilt is sufficient. 16 
II. BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROFFER HER 
PURPORTED TESTIMONY SHE HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE 
HER CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN LIMITING HER TESTIMONY; IN ANY 
CASE, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 20 
A. Defendant failed to preserve her claim for appeal 
bv failing to proffer her purported testimony 21 
i 
III. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED 
TO DEVELOP ANY RELEVANT RECORD FOR APPEAL OR 
IDENTIFY ANY DEFICIENCIES IN HER TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
PERFORMANCE 23 
A. Defendant must support her ineffective assistance claim 
with a record 24 
B. Because defendant has failed to develop an adequate record 
to support her claim that her trial counsel performed 
deficiently, the Court should presume that counsel's conduct 
was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance 26 
C. Defendant's other allegations of ineffective assistance are 
uniformly without merit and even contrary to the record 29 
CONCLUSION 33 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) 25 
STATE CASES 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 11 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993) 24 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) 24 
State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439 (Utah 1996) 21 
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) 24 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) 17 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989) 30 
State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185 1,11 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991) 22 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 19 
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) 23 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 2, 25 
State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998) 17 
State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998) 32 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1992) 12 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) 12, 16 
iii 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 16 
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994) 11 
State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah App. 1992) 24 
State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1986) 22 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 1994) 11 
State v. Telford, 940 P.2d 522 (Utah App. 1997) 2 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 989 P.2d 52 29 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) 3 
State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982) 24 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) . . . . . . 11 
Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) 22 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999) 2, 31 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) 1, 2, 10, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999) 2, 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) . . . . 1 
Utah R. App. 23B 2, 25, 26 
Utah R. Evid. 103 2, 21 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff Appellee, : Case No. 20000773-CA 
v. 
ANGELA RASMUSSEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction for robbery, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
I 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the defendant fail to marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, 
thus waiving her right to have her claim of insufficiency considered on appeal? "Failure to 
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency [of 
evidence] considered on appeal." State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189 (citing State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)). 
2. Should this Court consider defendant's claim that the trial court erred in excluding 
some of her testimony? '"[The reviewing court] will not set aside a verdict because of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of record/" State v. 
Telford, 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 
(Utah 1986) and Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2)). 
3. Should the Court review defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
unsupported by an adequate record on appeal? "Where the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of 
a finding that counsel performed effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,117, 12 P.3d 
92 (noting "the general rule that record inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on 
appeal") (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are 
attached at Addendum A: 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1999); 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Angela Rasmussen, was charged with robbery (R. 2-3). A jury convicted 
defendant of the offense charged (R. 75). The trial court denied defendant's motion for arrest 
of judgment (R. 126-27). The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory one-to-fifteen 
year term in the Utah State Prison. However, the court suspended the sentence, placing 
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defendant on probation on condition that she continue treatment with her psychotherapist and 
participate in theft and/or cognitive restructuring counseling (R. 104-05). Defendant filed 
a timely notice of appeal from her conviction (R. 107-08). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At about 5:00 p.m. on January 15, 2000, defendant went to a Dessert Industries 
("D.I.") thrift store in Sandy, Utah (R. 130:42, 55,132). Defendant noticed a wedding dress 
in the "bid" section which abuts the front of the store (R. 130:41, 134-135). The bid area is 
kept under lock for collectibles or antique items (R. 130:39-40). The area is posted with 
signs, including a large yellow sign identifying the bid area and explaining the bidding 
procedure and there is always at least one employee present to explain the procedures and 
to operate the cash registers (R. 130:40). The smaller items are locked in the glass area (R. 
130:40). The wedding dress was a larger item located in the bidding area but hung on a 
hanger between the bidding area and the glass next to the outside of the building (R. 130:40-
41). Defendant admitted she was familiar with the bid section of the store and the bidding 
procedure, and that she knew that bid items were not supposed to leave the bid area (R. 
130:155). 
Lindsay Waldron was also shopping at the D.I. on January 15 (R. 130:86). Ms. 
Waldron was surprised to see defendant standing behind her in the cashier line holding the 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995). 
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wedding dress from the bid area (R. 130:87). Having seen the wedding dress in the bid area 
and being familiar with the bidding process, she knew no one should have been in possession 
of the dress because the bidding date on the dress had not closed (R. 130:86-87). Ms. 
Waldron commented to her husband, standing near her in line, that the woman behind them 
had the wedding dress from the bid area in her hand (R. 130:88). Ms. Waldron spoke loud 
enough so the defendant could overhear what she was saying to her husband (R. 130:99). 
Ms. Waldron's husband looked back at defendant, who appeared startled (R. 130:88). 
Defendant then left the line with the dress and walked towards the back of the store (R. 
130:88, 100). 
Ms. Waldron noticed defendant in the middle of the store periodically looking at 
clothes on the racks and looking up at her and her husband (R. 130:88-89). Defendant still 
had the dress in her hand, and Ms. Waldron did not see anything else in defendant's hands 
(R. 130:89). When she reached the register, Ms. Waldron informed the cashier of what she 
had seen (R. 130:89). In the company of the cashier, Ms. Waldron found defendant exiting 
one of the dressing rooms, located by the store's exit, with a full duffle bag in her hand (R. 
130:89-90, 101). 
Mr. Wilcox, a D.I. employee, also saw defendant walking out of the dressing room 
(R. 130:42,90). Ms. Waldron came running to him, grabbed his arm, and reported what she 
had seen (R. 130:42, 101). He immediately directed three female employees to go into all 
four dressing rooms to locate the dress and return it him if they found it (R. 130:43). They 
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all returned empty-handed and said there was nothing to be found (R. 130:44). Based on his 
conversation with Ms. Waldron and others, Mr. Wilcox was confident that defendant had 
taken the dress from the store (R. 130:44-45). 
Both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron saw Defendant walk out of the D.I. carrying a 
bulging, small green duffle bag, about foot-and-half long (R. 130:45, 90). Ms. Waldron 
testified that the duffle bag was extremely full (R. 130:90). Mr. Wilcox asked Ms. Waldron 
to accompany him outside because he did not want to confront defendant without another 
woman present (R. 130:45,90). Both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron stepped outside the thrift 
store (R. 130:45,90). Following his usual practice, Mr. Wilcox was wearing a red employee 
vest along with a large identifying name tag(R. 130:39,48,55, 71). Within ten or fifteen feet 
of the door, Mr. Wilcox approached defendant and calmly introduced himself, saying, 
"Ma'am, I need to talk to you" (R. 130:45, 91). In response, defendant turned to face Mr. 
Wilcox. She looked scared; her eyes appeared "hysterical.... I mean they got huge" (R. 
130:46). Mr. Wilcox testified that defendant then turned, ran to her car, threw her packages 
in, and started the car up (R. 130:45-46, 75, 90-91). Ms. Waldron also confirmed that 
defendant, in glancing back, knew she had been approached but did not want to really 
acknowledge it (R. 130:91). 
Mr. Wilcox is completely unable to run or jump because he has a prosthetic knee from 
being trampled by a horse. He also has only one lung and at the time of the robbery was 
tethered to an "obvious" oxygen tank through a [tracheal tube] (R. 130:46-47, 91). 
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Mr. Wilcox walked over to Defendant's car (R. 130:46-47, 71). He knocked on the 
car's passenger window and again "nicely" said, "Ma'am, I need to speak to you" (R. 
130:46-47, 71-72, 92). Mr. Wilcox's employee badge and red vest were "right in her 
window," and defendant was looking right him (R. 130:46). Ms. Waldron, standing behind 
Mr. Wilcox as he knocked on Defendant's car window, observed that Mr. Wilcox addressed 
defendant in a friendly manner (R. 130:92). 
Defendant reversed her car "and went screaming backwards," causing Mr. Wilcox to 
move towards another car (R. 130:47-48, 93). His evasive movement left defendant with 
three lanes in which to drive off (R. 130:48). As defendant's car faced him, he pointed at his 
red vest. Defendant's eyes again got big, she revved the engine, and she drove straight 
towards him (R. 130:48-49,93,97). Ms. Waldron testified that defendant had room to avoid 
hitting Mr. Wilcox (R. 130:93). Defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her car once and then a 
second time, throwing him onto the hood and then to the pavement. Only when defendant 
turned and drove away did Mr. Wilcox roll off defendant's car (R. 130:49, 76-77, 94, 97-
98). Ms. Waldron considered the incident intentional and not accidental (R. 130:95). 
Ms. Waldron ran to record the make and license plate number of defendant's car (R. 
130:51, 94). Officer Troy Arnold of the Sandy City Police Department investigated the 
robbery (R. 130:109). He found that the D.I. camera surveillance system did not cover the 
entire floor, including the dressing room, nor did it even show defendant (R. 130: 111, 113-
14). From the vehicle's description Detective Arnold identified defendant as the owner of 
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the vehicle (R. 130:110-111). Based on that information, Officer Michael Hopkins of the 
Sandy City Police Department went to defendant's residence in South Jordan later that day 
(R. 130:120, 122). 
Once at defendant's residence, Officer Hopkins requested to look in the garage and 
in the car (R. 130:123). Defendant and her husband consented (R. 130:123). Officer 
Hopkins did not see the bag in either of these two locations (R. 130:124). When he asked 
to search the residence, the Rasmussens declined, stating, "No, not without a warrant" (R. 
130:123). Officer Hopkins did not search the house (R. 130:123). Both Officers Arnold and 
Hopkins saw a large palm print on the left-hand side of the hood of Defendant's vehicle that 
was smeared as if the hand had been sliding (R. 130:111, 117, 119, 121). 
Five people, including Mr. Wilcox, searched the entire store for the wedding dress 
immediately after the robbery and repeatedly in days afterward and failed to find it (R. 
130:54, 68-69). The dress was only found by a D.I. employee five or six days later, turned 
inside out and "shoved in the middle of all of our stuff (R. 130:65-66, 68, 125-26). Mr. 
Wilcox had no doubt that the dress must have re-entered the store through its front doors (R. 
130:68). Officer Mark Soper of the Sandy City Police Department received the dress from 
the D.L after it was found (R. 130:125-26). He was informed that the dress had been found 
in the bid section of the D.L under the edge of the table 'to the customer's side" (R. 
130:126). Officer Soper testified that the dress would not have been difficult to see (R. 
130:126-27). 
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As a result of defendant's actions, Mr. Wilcox sustained considerable injuries for 
which, at the time of trial six months after the robbery, he was still receiving treatment (R. 
130:49-50). Specifically, Mr. Wilcox suffered neck and head injuries that have resulted in 
constant headaches (R. 130:49-50). Also, his artificial knee was chipped and the blood flow 
in both his legs has been restricted, all of which may require him to ultimately use a 
wheelchair (R. 130:49). 
Defendant testified on her own behalf (R. 130:131-66). She claimed that she took the 
dress to the cashier because it did not have a bid slip on it and she wanted to know what the 
minimum bid was (R. 130:135-36). After standing in line for a few minutes, she walked off 
to look at other items in the store (R. 130:139-140). At some point she looked at the tag on 
the dress and, seeing it too large, left it with the other formal dresses (R. 140-41). She then 
meandered through the store (130:144). She went to the dressing room to try on some pants, 
but she did not like them (R. 130:144-45). Then she left the store (R. 130:145). She denied 
taking the dress from the store (R. 130:164). 
Defendant claims that outside the store Mr. Wilcox approached her with an angry 
expression on his face, which intimidated her a little (R. 130:145-46). She claims that she 
did not hear him say anything to her, nor did see him wearing a vest or name tag (R. 130:146, 
166). However, when he "pounded" on the window of her car, she panicked (R. 130:147). 
When she attempted to drive away, she found "that same man . . . sitting on my car," w ith 
a "defiant expression," "like . . . ' What are you going to do?'" (R. 130:148,150). However, 
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because she did not want to hurt him, she moved slowly forward, though fast enough that he 
fell off the car (R. 130:148). Defendant did not recall ever hitting Mr. Wilcox (R. 130:150). 
She claimed she was "just bewildered" and that her conduct was due to past abusive 
experience (R. 130:149-50). 
Defendant not only denied refusing Officer Hopkins' request to search the house, but 
rather asserted that she and her husband invited the search, saying: "Go ahead, check 
everything" (R. 130:152). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Court should decline to consider defendant's insufficiency of evidence claim 
because she has substantially failed to marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict. Even considering defendant's claim, the substantial, unmarshaled evidence clearly 
supports defendant's robbery conviction: with the exception of a very brief period during 
which defendant was in or near the dressing rooms, defendant was always observed in 
possession of the stolen dress; defendant exited the dressing rooms carrying a '"bulging" 
duffel bag not previously noticed by a witness who watched her; repeated searches of the 
dressing rooms immediately after defendant's exit and of the entire store failed to uncover 
the dress until five days afterward; defendant fled the premises in a violent manner, causing 
serious injury to a clearly identifiable store employee. 
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POINT II 
The Court should decline to consider defendant's claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion in excluding her testimony about her extreme reactions in the parking lot because 
she failed to proffer the substance of her purported testimony. Without a proffer this Court 
cannot determine whether defendant is entitled to a reversal of her conviction. In any case, 
any error was harmless because the extra record source relied on by defendant, besides being 
an improper proffer, is insufficient to show that the outcome would have been different. 
POINT III 
The Court should decline to consider defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim because defendant has failed to support her claims with a record on appeal. To the 
extent that defendant may have referenced the record, her claims readily fail to show her 
counsel performed deficiently. Indeed, several assertions are contrary to the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS SUBSTANTIALLY FAILED TO 
MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S NONMERITORIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for robbery, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1999). Aplt. Br. at 9-15. However, because 
defendant has substantially failed to marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, 
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this Court should decline to consider defendant's sufficiency claim. Even considering the 
claim, the evidence was sufficient. 
A claim of insufficient evidence will not be reviewed unless the appellant marshals 
all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and demonstrates how the evidence, and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom, is insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins 
Exch., 817 P.2d789, 799 (Utah 1991); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to review claim of error 
where the defendant Wholly failed to marshal the evidence," "fail[ed] to show how it [was] 
insufficient to support the verdict," and "fail[ed] to address key evidence") (citations 
omitted). "Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
insufficiency [of evidence] considered on appeal." State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189 
(citing State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)). 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that 
the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). This Court 
has stated that marshaling the evidence serves the important function of "reminding litigants 
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial," and that it "aids 
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the appellate courts in deliberations and the opinion-writing process. Moore, 802 P 2d at 
739. As set out below, defendant substantially failed to marshal all the evidence in support 
of the jury's verdict thus waiving the right to have her claim of insufficiency considered on 
appeal. State v Mincy, 838 P.2d 648,652 (Utah App. 1992) (citingMoore, 802 P.2d at 738-
39). 
A. Defendant failed to marshal the evidence. 
Defendant cursorily marshals evidence showing that she was seen in possession of the 
wedding dress some time before it "allegedly could not be found"; thereafter, she was seen 
leaving the D.I. dressing room with a duffel bag that "appeared" to be bulging and fled the 
scene despite "alleged" requests to stop, during which she hit "an individual" with her car; 
after the incident she "allegedly" refused to allow police to search her home. Aplt. at 13. 
In fact, the prosecution introduced substantially more evidence in support of 
defendant's guilt than defendant acknowledges: 
(1) defendant admitted she was familiar with the bid section of the store 
and the bidding procedure, and that she knew that bid items were 
not supposed to leave the bid area (R. 130:155); 
(2) defendant does not deny that she removed the wedding dress from 
the bid area (R. 130:135-136); 
(3) when defendant overheard Ms. Waldron express her surprise about 
defendant's inappropriate possession of the dress, she abandoned 
her place in line and her alleged inquiry about the bid status 
of the dress, and then walked toward the rear of the store 
(R. 130:88,99-100); 
(4) Ms. Waldron observed defendant, dress always in hand, browse 
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through the clothes racks while periodically looking up at Ms. 
Waldron and her husband (R. 130: 88-89); 
(5) in the company of a cashier, Ms. Waldron found defendant exiting 
one of the dressing rooms, located by the store's exit, with an 
"extremely full" duffle bag in her hand (R. 130:89-90, 101); 
(6) prior to defendant's exit from the dressing rooms, Ms. Waldron had 
not seen anything other than the wedding dress in defendant's 
possession (R. 130:88-89) 
(7) an immediate search of all he dressing rooms by three employees failed 
to uncover the wedding dress (R. 130:43-44);2 
(8) both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron saw defendant walk out of the 
D.I. carrying a bulging, small green duffle bag, about a foot-
and-halflong(R. 130:45,90); 
(9) Mr. Wilcox approached defendant in a calm and friendly manner, 
asking to speak with her (R. 130:45, 91); 
(10) in accordance with his usual practice, Mr. Wilcox was wearing a red 
employee vest along with a large identifying name tag (R. 130:39, 
48,55,71); 
(11) Mr. Wilcox is disabled, to wit: he has a prosthetic knee, which 
prevents him from running and he has one lung, which necessitates 
2
 Defendant excuses herself from marshaling the results of the fruitless dressing 
room search on the mistaken belief that the evidence was excluded as inadmissible 
hearsay and for lack of foundation. Aplt. Br. at 14. Defense counsel successfully 
objected on both grounds to the prosecutor's initial attempts to introduce employees' 
reports to Mr. Wilcox about the results of their search of the dressing rooms (R. 130:43-
44). However, the prosecutor then laid a satisfactory foundation for the employees' 
reports, after which the evidence was admitted (R. 130:43). Also, defense counsel failed 
to move to strike the employees' statements to Mr. Wilcox that "nothing was in there," 
testimony in response to a proper question (R. 130:44). Additionally, the prosecutor 
achieved her objective by eliciting from Mr. Wilcox that employees returned from the 
search "[without] anything in their hands" (R. 130:44). 
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his wearing a plainly visible oxygen tank (R. 130:46-47, 91); 
(12) both Mr. Wilcox and Ms. Waldron testified that defendant, from 
her reactions, was aware that Mr. Wilcox had tried to accost her 
(R. 130:46,91); 
(13) in response to Mr. Wilcox's attempts to accost her, defendant turned 
and fled to her car (R. 130:45, 90-91); 
(14) Mr. Waldron confirmed that when Mr. Wilcox reached defendant's car, 
he again attempted to address defendant in a friendly manner by 
tapping on the car window (R. 130:46-47, 71-72, 92); 
(15) in response, defendant started her car and put it in reverse, causing 
it to go "screaming backwards," knocking Mr. Wilcox toward 
another car (R. 130:47-48); then, with her car pointing directly at 
Mr. Wilcox, defendant revved her engine and drove right at him 
(R. 130:48-49, 93, 97); 
(16) defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her car once and then a second time, 
throwing him onto the hood and then to the pavement car, causing 
him serious bodily (R. 130:49-50, 76-77, 94, 97-98); 
(17) Ms. Waldron testified that defendant had room to avoid hitting Mr. 
Wilcox and considered the incident intentional and not accidental 
(R. 130:93, 95); 
(18) five employees, including Mr. Wilcox, again searched the D.I. store for 
the wedding dress on January 15, immediately after the incident and 
repeatedly in days afterward, but failed to find it (R. 130:54, 68-69); 
(19) the missing dress reappeared in the bid area five days after the 
robbery in a place in which it would not have been difficult to see 
(R. 130:125-27); 
(20) defendant seriously undermined her own credibility by giving testimony, 
which in light of the testimony of other witnesses and the circumstances, 
was highly implausible and, by inference, incriminating: 
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- in spite of Mr. Wilcox's red employee's vest and name tag, 
defendant denied that Mr. Wilcox was unidentifiable to 
her as a D.I. employee (R. 130:146, 166); 
- in spite of Ms. Waldron's and Mr. Wilcox's testimony to 
the contrary, defendant insisted that Mr. Wilcox 
approached her angrily (R. 130:145-46); 
- in spite of Mr. Wilcox's palpable injuries, defendant claimed she 
drove her car slowly forward and that she did not recall 
ever hitting Mr. Wilcox with her car (R. 130:148, 150); 
- in spite of Mr. Wilcox's obvious physical limitations and 
burdens from medical appliances, defendant claimed that 
as she tried to drive away she found him sitting on the 
hood of her car with his arms crossed, wearing a 
defiant expression (R. 130:148, 150); 
- in spite Officer Hopkins' testimony that the Rasmussens 
refused consent to search their house without a warrant 
and that consequently the police did not search the house, 
defendant asserted that she and her husband very readily 
invited a search (R. 130:123, 152). 
As discussed briefly in the following section, the foregoing unmarshaled evidence 
forms the basis for reasonable inferences of defendant's guilt, inferences that could not be 
derived or necessarily supported from defendant's cursory and incomplete rendition of the 
facts. Because defendant so seriously fails to marshal this evidence on which the jury's 
verdict was evidently based, this Court should decline to consider defendant's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence. In any case, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence is without merit. 
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B. The evidence of defendant's guilt is sufficient3 
In order to successfully challenge a jury's verdict the reviewing court must find that 
the evidence and inferences based on that evidence are so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,. 
444 (Utah 1983). In undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the evidence, 
along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to the verdict/' 
Moore, 802 P.2d at 738 (citation omitted). "[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the jury's findings, [the reviewing court] will not disturb them." Id. 
(citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). 
To convict the defendant of second degree robbery the State was required to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly used force or fear of immediate force 
against Mr. Wilcox in the course of committing or attempting to commit a theft.4 The 
3
 In the proceedings below, defendant moved for a directed verdict and to arrest 
judgment (R. 93-102, 130:131). The trial court denied both motions (R. 126-27, 
130:181). However, defendant's notice of appeal, filed prior to the court's denial of her 
motion to arrest judgment (R. 107-08), and her entire discussion on appeal, do not 
challenge the trial court's rulings on her motions. Rather, defendant appears only to 
generally challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
Accordingly, the State's discussion is tailored to this general challenge. 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal 
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
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evidence marshaled in the preceding section shows that the prosecution met its burden at 
trial, and, accordingly, that defendant has failed to meet her burden on appeal. 
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to show that she "knowingly 
used force or fear of immediate force against Mr. Wilcox." Rather, the central thrust of 
defendant's argument is that proof of the theft, supported only by circumstantial evidence, 
is insufficient. Aplt. Br. at 10-15. In essence, defendant argues that without direct evidence 
that defendant had the dress in her possession when she left the D.I. store the prosecution 
failed to prove an element of the offense. Defendant misconstrues the requirements of the 
law. 
"It is well-settled in this state that 'a conviction can be based on sufficient 
circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,344 (Utah 1997)). "In such a case, [the reviewing court] must 
determine '(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the 
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a 
basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman, 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in 
an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree 
17 
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). 
The circumstantial evidence marshaled above readily support reasonable, logical 
inferences that defendant committed a theft, i.e., that defendant left the store with the dress. 
Defendant was seen in possession of only the wedding dress moments before its 
disappearance (R. 130:87-90, 100, 136). Moments later she was seen walking from the 
dressing rooms to the store's exit with nothing but a bulging duffle bag (R. 130:42, 45, 89-
90, 101). A thorough search of the dressing rooms immediately after defendant's egress 
failed to locate the dress (R. 130:43-44). Although, defendant claimed she left the dress on 
a clothes rack in the store, an immediate search and later, repeated searches of the entire store 
after the robbery failed to turn up the missing dress (R. 130: 54, 68-69, 113-114). The 
missing dress was discovered five days later in a place in which it would not have been 
difficult to see, after defendant had refused consent to search her house (R. 130:123,125-27). 
From the foregoing facts the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant took 
the dress into a dressing room, put it into a previously concealed bag, and then left the store 
with it. The logic of the inference is supported by the dress's disappearance immediately 
after defendant's admitted possession of it and defendant's carrying a previously unnoticed 
bulging duffel bag out of the store immediately after the dress was last seen. The failure of 
D.I.'s staff to locate the dress after repeated searches lends further strength to the inference 
that from the time Ms. Waldron saw defendant with the dress until it was discovered five 
days later, only defendant was in possession of it. Indeed, the odd circumstances of the 
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dress's ultimate discovery support the inference that the dress was secreted back into the D.I. 
store by someone who wished to avoid detection. 
Defendant's conduct also supports the inference that defendant committed a theft. 
"While a defendant's flight from a crime scene, standing alone, 'does not support an 
inference of intentional conduct,' . . . the circumstances of a defendant's flight, in addition 
to other circumstantial evidence, may be adequate to support such an inference. State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^23, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 
1991)). '"Flight by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant, but is merely 
a circumstance to be considered with other factors as tending to show a consciousness of 
guilt and therefore guilt itself.'" Id. at [^23 n.6 (quoting Charles E. Torcia ed., 13th ed. 
1972)) (emphasis added). 
The evidence marshaled above shows that defendant disregarded reasonable attempts 
by a readily identifiable D.I. employee to accost her and inquire about her activities (R. 
130:39,45, 48, 55, 71, 91). In response, defendant fled to her car, again disregarded 
reasonable attempts to make contact with her, and intentionally drove directly into her victim 
in an effort to escape (R. 130:45-50,71-72,76-77,90-91,93-95,97-98). From this evidence 
the jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant's acts betrayed a guilty mind in having 
stolen the dress. 
Finally, the evidence marshaled above strongly suggests that defendant lied on the 
stand. In the face of credible evidence to the contrary, defendant claimed that she could not 
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recognize Mr. Wilcox as a D.I. employee, that he approached her angrily, that she did not 
recall driving into Mr. Wilcox with her car, that she suddenly found her obviously medically 
compromised pursuer perched on the hood of her car with a defiant expression, and that she 
welcomed a police search of her house (R. 130:123, 145-46, 148, 150, 152, 166). From this 
evidence the jury would likely have doubted defendant's credibility, from which it further 
inferred defendant's guilt. 
In sum, the evidence which defendant failed to marshal reasonably and logically 
supports the inference that defendant stole the dress and committed robbery. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROFFER HER PURPORTED 
TESTIMONY SHE HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE HER CLAIM THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING HER 
TESTIMONY; IN ANY CASE, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow her to testify 
about a specific event which, purportedly, would have explained her behavior outside the D.I. 
store. Aplt. Br. at 16-18. However, because defense counsel failed to proffer the substance 
of defendant's purported testimony, this Court lacks a record on which to assess defendant's 
claim. Even if the Court were to construe the substance of defendant's purported testimony 
and find the trial court abused its discretion in excluding it, the error would be harmless 
because exclusion of the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the case. 
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A. Defendant failed to preserve her claim for appeal 
bv failing to proffer her purported testimony. 
'" [The reviewing court] will not set aside a verdict because of the erroneous exclusion 
of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of record, and [the court] believe[s] that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict.'" State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 445 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. 
RammeU 721 P.2d 498,499-500 (Utah 1986)). InArguelles, the record was silent about what 
evidence the defendant's counsel intended to adduce in examining a witness. Id. at 445. 
Therefore, because the court had no means of assessing whether that evidence could have led 
to an acquittal, it declined to address the merits of defendant's claim. Id. See also Utah R. 
Evid. 103 (a)(2) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked."). 
This Court should decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim for the same 
reasons applicable mArguelles. On direct examination, defense counsel asked defendant to 
explain her response to Mr. Wilcox's approach in the parking lot (R. 130:149). Defendant 
answered that, "Pm very anxious and fearful... because I've had a history of abusive kinds 
of situations happening to me" (R. 130:149). When defense counsel inquired further about 
what made defendant "so intimidated in life," the prosecution objected on the ground that 
defendant's prior experiences were irrelevant and that defendant sought to introduce them 
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merely to gain sympathy (R. 130:149). The trial court sustained the objection, stating that 
defendant had already testified to her heightened sensitivities and that further delving into 
her personal affairs on any specific occasion was unnecessary (R. 130:149). 
Defendant's claim fails because, at the very least, he failed to make a proffer of 
defendant's purported testimony at the time the trial court denied further examination. 
Defendant cites State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), in support of her claim 
that evidence of prior events which tends to disprove criminal intent is admissible. Aplt. Br. 
at 16-17. See id. at 781 (citing with approval State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1986) and 
Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979)). However, in Harrison, 
Smith, and Zions, the party challenging the trial court's denial of further examination made 
a substantial proffer of the prospective evidence. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 781 (the 
defendant's testimony that he was threatened and his car fire-bombed by "Crips" two months 
before fatal shooting was relevant to show why the defendant, charged with murder, regularly 
carried a gun); Smith, 728 P.2d at 1015 (finding admissible testimony of the defendant, 
previously incarcerated, that he would never have knowingly done an illegal act in such an 
open manner for fear of returning to prison where his poor health due to emphysema and 
tuberculosis would deteriorate further); cf. Zions, 605 P.2d at 322-23 (upholding trial court's 
very limited admission of evidence following proffer of explicit information of defendant's 
hysterical conduct in prior shoplifting incident four years earlier). 
Defendant's attempted proffer on appeal is unavailing. She cites not to any proffer 
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made when trial court excluded her testimony, but rather to a single line from her version of 
the offense in the presentence report: "[Defendant] advised she was assaulted by a man 
previously, which caused her to feel her safety was in jeopardy" (Presentence report, R. 128 
at p. 3). That statement cannot stand as a proffer not only because there is no certainty that 
it was the testimony defendant would have offered at trial, but also because a proffer must 
be timely in order for the trial court to intelligently rule on its admissibility. Cf. State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) ("A timely objection provides the trial court with 
'an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'") (citation omitted). 
Further, exclusion of such a slender statement, which may have been remote in time, could 
hardly have resulted in a different outcome. In short, defendant has failed to make the 
minimal showing under the Arguelles standard that the trial court abused its discretion in 
excluding her purported testimony. 
POINT HI 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO 
DEVELOP ANY RELEVANT RECORD FOR APPEAL OR IDENTIFY 
ANY DEFICIENCIES IN HER TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE 
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of 
numerous alleged deficiencies in her trial counsel's performance. Aplt. Br. at 19-28. 
However, defendant's claim fails because she has failed either to support the alleged 
deficiencies with an adequate record or to show that her counsel was deficient. 
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A. Defendant must support her ineffective assistance claim with a record. 
"[An appellate court] review[s] a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel by first 
determining whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, determining whether 
the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 
(Utah App. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668,687,104 S. Ct. 2052,2064 
(1984)). 
"Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be 
demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Further, an 
appellate court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings below when appellant fails to 
provide an adequate record on appeal." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 
1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (citing Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 
(Utah 1989)). In State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and 
responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that 
record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which 
the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply cannot rule on 
a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by 
the record. 
Id. at 293 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reasserted that, since the adoption of rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate court will simply assume that trial counsel 
performed effectively if a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unsupported by an 
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adequate record: "If a defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel 
was ineffective/ Utah R. App. P. 23B, defendant bears the primary obligation and burden 
of moving for a temporary remand." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^16, 12 P.3d 92 
(recognizing that "[rule 23B] was specifically designed to address the inadequate record 
dilemma").5 "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively." Id. at 1J17 (noting that "[t]his presumption is consistent with the 
fundamental policies dictated by Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 689, [that] 'courts must indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance/ and with the general rule that record inadequacies result in an 
assumption of regularity on appeal") (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 
1997)). 
5
 Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of 
fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a 
nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective. 
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B. Because defendant has failed to develop an adequate record 
to support her claim that her trial counsel performed deficiently, 
the Court should presume that counsel's conduct was within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
Defendant makes the following claims of ineffective assistance which are 
inadequately supported by a record on appeal: 
Failure to call psychiatrist 
Defendant claims her counsel failed to call her psychiatrist who allegedly would have 
testified about defendant's being the target of past abuse and her panic reactions when 
confronted by men she perceives to be aggressive. Aplt. Br. at 20. The State acknowledges 
that accompanying the presentence report is a four-page letter of a Dr. Lane Smith, 
defendant's psychiatrist, that supports defendant's assertions about her psychiatric condition 
(Letter of Dr. Lane Smith accompanying presentence report, R. 128). However, the letter is 
unsworn, was never authenticated, never admitted, and was never the basis of any sworn 
testimony. Thus, it would be insufficient to support a motion for a remand for a hearing 
under rule 23 B and should not be considered part of the record for evidentiary purposes. See 
Utah R. App. P. 23B(b) ("The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging 
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance 
of the attorney.") (emphasis added). 
Even if the Court considered Dr. Smith's letter a sufficient record to support an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defense counsel would have been acting well within 
the range of reasonable professional competence in not calling Dr. Smith to testify. If 
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defendant had called Dr. Smith to testify as an expert on her psychiatric condition, defendant 
would had been required to give notice and disclose the substance of his testimony. See Utah 
Code Ann. ^ 77-17-13(1) & (2) (1999). Assuming Dr. Smith's letter constituted sufficient 
disclosure, the prosecution would have learned, among other compromising information, that 
Dr. Smith repeatedly referenced defendant as a "kleptomaniac" who had committed minor 
thefts on several occasions, subsequently returning the stolen goods out of guilt (Letter of Dr. 
Lane Smith, pp. 1-3). Defense counsel quite reasonably might have chosen not to call Dr. 
Smith, considering the negative effect that such disclosures might have had on the jury. 
Failure to investigate whether D.I. store had been 
searched and to introduce evidence to the contrary 
Defendant claims her counsel failed to investigate whether the D.I. store had been 
searched by employees subsequent to the disappearance of the dress and failed to introduce 
evidence that it had not been so searched. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. This allegation is unsupported 
by any record evidence. 
Failure to put on evidence that items in the D.I. store are frequently misplaced 
Defendant claims her counsel "failed to investigate and put on a witness that allegedly 
could have established that the clothing sections in the D. I. are frequently unorganized and 
that items are routinely misplaced. Aplt. Br. at 23. This allegation is unsupported by any 
record evidence. 
Failure to point out discrepancies in prosecution witnesses9 testimony 
Defendant claims her counsel "failed to point out that the stories told by the 
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prosecution witnesses varied widely." Aplt. Br. at 23. Defendant recites alleged 
discrepancies between witnesses' trial testimony and their statements to the police. In 
support, defendant references a police report, which she has also attached to her brief. Aplt. 
Br. at 23 n.8. However, the police report was never an exhibit in any proceeding and was 
never made part of the record on appeal. Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the 
State has moved this Court to strike the police report from the addendum to defendant's 
opening brief. 
Failure to introduce the bag into evidence 
Defendant claims her counsel failed to introduce her bag into evidence and thereby 
failed to show that the dress would not fit into it. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. This allegation is 
unsupported by any record evidence. 
Failure to show that police officer's testimony was untrue 
Defendant claims her counsel failed to demonstrate that Officer Hopkins' testimony, 
that defendant refused consent to search her house, was untrue. Aplt. Br. at 24. In support, 
defendant relies on the "Law Enforcement Statement" in the presentence report, the police 
report referenced above, and "other witnesses, including [defendant's] husband, who could 
have been called to substantiate her testimony that there was no refusal to permit a search of 
the home." Aplt. Br. at 24. In fact, the Law Enforcement Statement directly contradicts 
defendant's assertion, stating: "[Detective Soper] advised the defendant was untruthful 
during the trial in claiming she told officers they could search her entire house, when in fact 
28 
she demanded a search warrant if they wanted to search anywhere other than the garage" 
(Presentence report, R. 128, p. 5). Further, the police report or the testimony of "other 
witnesses" was never made part of the record. 
Failure to point out nonexistence of video surveillance 
Defendant claims that defense counsel, "[knowing] that no videotape of store 
surveillance existed... failed to point out this inaccuracy in policy [sic] testimony. Aplt. Br. 
at 25 (citing R 130:112). The allegation that defense counsel knew that no video surveillance 
tape existed is unsupported by any record evidence. In fact, Detective Arnold testified that 
he viewed the surveillance videotape and that it revealed nothing (R. 130:112-14). 
In sum, because defendant has failed to support any of the foregoing allegations of 
ineffective assistance with record evidence, the Court should presume that defendant's trial 
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
C Defendant's other allegations of ineffective assistance 
are uniformly without merit and even contrary to the record. 
""The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, P34, 989 
P.2d 52 (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982))). 
Failure to challenge testimony that defendant hit victim 
Defendant claims her counsel "inexcusably undermined [defendant's] credibility" by 
not challenging prosecution witnesses who testified that defendant hit Mr. Wilcox with her 
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car. Instead, defendant argues that defense counsel should have supported defendant's 
testimony that she did not believe she hit Mr. Wilcox. Aplt. Br. at 25. 
This claim is unsound. Ms. Waldron testified that although defendant had substantial 
room to avoid hitting Mr. Wilcox, she drove directly into him, paused and then struck him 
a second time, throwing him onto the hood of her car; she considered defendant's acts to be 
intentional (R. 130:93-95, 97-99). As a result of defendant's actions, Mr. Wilcox suffered 
substantial, if not serious bodily injury, evidence not credibly challenged either in the trial 
court or on appeal (R. 130:49-50). Mr. Wilcox is limited by a prosthetic knee and his tether 
to oxygen (R. 130:46-47, 91). Defendant fails to show that the evidence concerning Mr. 
Wilcox's physical condition before and after the robbery is creditably challengeable. In light 
of this substantial evidence, defendant's assertions at trial, that she did not believe she had 
hit Mr. Wilcox with her car and that she simply discovered him sitting on the hood of her car 
with a "defiant expression," might reasonably have struck defense counsel as testimony not 
to be highlighted at the risk of completely losing credibility with the jury (R. 130:148, 150). 
See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) ("Whenever there is a legitimate 
exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not 
produce the expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel."). 
Failure to point out that defendant was not 
observed taking the dress into the dressing room 
Defendant claims that defense counsel failed to point out to the jury that "no witness 
ever saw [her] take the dress into the dressing room." Aplt. Br. at 25 (emphasis in 
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defendant's brief). This claim is directly controverted by the record. In fact, defense counsel 
elicited from Ms. Waldron on cross-examination that she did not see defendant take the dress 
into the dressing room (R. 130:100-01). Further, defense counsel pointed out to the jury in 
closing this weakness in the State's theory (R. 131:192). 
Failure to object to the admission of victim Js injuries 
Defendant claims her counsel failed to object to testimony concerning Mr. Wilcox's 
injuries as "irrelevant, prejudicial, and hearsay." She further claims that counsel could have 
shown the injuries were "grossly overstated," based on "the police report." Aplt. Br. at 25. 
This claim is without legal merit and unsupported by the record on appeal. The description 
of the injuries were plainly not hearsay since Mr. Wilcox was testifying about his own 
experience of his physical condition; they were plainly not prejudicial, since he merely 
described his injuries in words, without even displaying them to the jury; they were plainly 
relevant to prove an element of the offense, that defendant acted with "force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft" (R. 130:49-50). Again, 
the police report relied on by defendant has never been made part of the record on appeal. 
Failure to raise self-defense 
Defendant claims her trial counsel should have asked for an instruction on self-
defense in order to explain to the jury that "she was acting with the intent to escape bodily 
injury or death." Aplt. Br. at 21-22. This claim is utterly without legal foundation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999) (emphasis added), provides in pertinent part: 
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(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and 
to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend 
himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. 
However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force 
is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to herself... as a result 
of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission 
of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified 
in Subsection (1) if he or she: 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) was the aggressor . . . . 
Based on the requirements of section 76-2-402, defendant was not entitled to a self-
defense instruction. As recited repeatedly throughout this brief, Mr. Wilcox posed no threat 
at all, let alone a threat to defendant of death or serious bodily injury. Thus, defendant's 
running her victim down could not have been based on a "reasonable belief," regardless of 
her own peculiar perceptions. Secondly, there was sufficient evidence that defendant was 
committing a felony when she used unjustifiable force. Third, the evidence shows that 
defendant was the aggressor in the incident. Therefore, since defendant was not entitled to 
a self-defense instruction, defense counsel did not act deficiently in not requesting one. 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that her trial counsel's performance was deficient 
in any respect claimed on appeal. Because defendant "cannot show the [she] satisfied the 
first part of the Strickland test, [the reviewing court] need not consider the second. See State 
v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1998). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. This request is bolstered by 
defendant's uniform failure to fulfill the basic requirements of marshaling the evidence and 
presenting an adequate record for appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /? day of March, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Randy T. Austin, Kirton & McConkie, attorneys for 
defendant, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, P.O. Box 45120, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84145-0120, this ff day of March, 2001. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony 
defined. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force. However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person 
as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the 
commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified 
in Subsection (1) if he or she: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission 
or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, 
unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communi-
cates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the 
other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful 
force; and 
(ii) for purposes of Subsection (i) the following do not, by them-
selves, constitute "combat by agreement": 
(A) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing rela-
tionship; or 
(B) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal 
right to be. 
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened 
force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully 
entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(c). 
(4) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated 
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and 
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, 
object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and 
arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony 
offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to 
create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a 
forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not 
constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time 
unlawful entry is made or attempted. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the 
trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, amy of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger, 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or 
serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-17-13* Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon 
as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the 
hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(2) (a) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. 
(b) If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(3) (a) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom 
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony; including the 
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. 
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided to the other 
party. 
(b) If the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report does 
not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony, or in the event the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party 
intending to call the rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation 
of the witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the 
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed 
by a copy of any report prepared by any rebuttal expert when available. 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of 
this section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the 
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of 
the expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by 
the expert at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary 
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's 
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at 
which the expert may be called as an expert witness. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 23B, Motion to remand for findings necessary to 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, 
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall 
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the^motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffec-
tiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to 
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be 
filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the 
ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial 
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the 
order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that 
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural 
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand 
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consider-
ation of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after 
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. 
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court 
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient perfor-
mance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, 
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be 
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court 
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
<f> Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings 
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made 
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1^ 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling* 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection 
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance 
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or oifers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
